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An Approach Towards Anomaly Based Detection and Profiling Covert TCP/IP Channels 
Patrick A. Gilbert 
Firewalls and detection systems have been used for preventing and detecting 
attacks by a wide variety of mechanisms. A problem has arisen where users and 
applications can circumvent security policies because of the particularities in the TCP/IP 
protocol, the ability to obfuscate the data payload, tunnel protocols, and covertly simulate 
a permitted communication. It has been shown that unusual traffic patterns may lead to 
discovery of covert channels that employ packet headers. In addition, covert channels 
can be detected by observing an anomaly in unused packet header fields. Presently, we 
are not aware of any schemes that address detecting anomalous traffic patterns that can 
potentially be created by a covert channel. 
In this work, we will explore the approach of combining anomaly based detection 
and covert channel profiling to be used for detecting a very precise subset of covert 
storage channels in network protocols. We shall also discuss why this method is more 
practical and industry-ready compared to the present research on how to profile and 
mitigate these types of attacks. Finally, we shall describe a specialized tool to passively 
monitor networks for these types of attacks and show how it can be used to build an 
efficient hybrid covert channel and anomaly based detection system. 
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TCP/IP was not designed with security in mind and thus has very few security 
components by default. The protocols lack many features that are desirable or needed on 
an insecure network, such as authentication or encryption. The designers did not spend a 
great deal of effort securing this protocol, because after all, the goal wasn't to support 
communications that required a high degree of confidentiality or integrity. The goal of 
the project was to develop a protocol for the open exchange of information in a small 
community and users generally trusted each other. 
As the usage of the Internet and the TCP/IP protocols increased, it became apparent 
that security would become more and more problematic. The TCP/IP protocol was being 
used for a wide variety of applications and even implemented into devices as a migration 
path from serial connections and proprietary interfaces. Today, a plethora of devices are 
now internet protocol (IP) enabled and we must compose with these devices and 
applications. 
Given the increasing complexity, it has become a daunting task to define a network 
security policy that ensures that you are permitting the proper protocols between a host 
and destination. Permitting a proprietary protocol could open a security breach because a 
different TCP/IP communication could be tunnelled through. As an example, permitting 
the SSH protocol to communicate with any host on the internet opens up the possibility 
of tunnelling anything and everything through this channel, whereas the network's stated 
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security policy intended only that connections must be encrypted if they are to leave the 
corporate network. The goal of the policy is met, but has the adverse effect of allowing 
convert TCP/IP channels. 
In this work, we will explore the approach of anomaly based detection and profiling 
to be used for detecting a very precise subset of covert storage channels in certain 
network protocols. It is well known that in computer networks, overt channels such as 
network protocols are used as carriers for covert channels [1] [2]. 
This reduced scope fulfills the precise requirements as stated by my sponsor and 
serves as a basis for future work for detecting and profiling more elaborate covert 
channels. An elegant and more elaborate practical example is stated in [3]. As pointed out 
by Zander [4] and Van Horenbeeck [5], there exists a gap between academic research on 
this topic and real world applications; the applicability of the some approaches on 
detection in the current academic research is definitely questionable. 
Our approach differs from the current academic research on this topic because it is 
industry-ready and being used with appreciable results in a very large production 
environment with a high-speed gigabit network. The approach has taken into account 
certain constraints in order to not possibly disrupt or degrade performance, a limitation 
that doesn't exist in the current academic theory and proof of concepts. 
Finally, while our approach has been successful, it requires constant refinement to 
detect improvements made to covert channels rendering them more difficult to detect. Is 
it expected that this trend will continue. 
1.2 The network security problem 
Network security attempts to mitigate weaknesses introduced by network-connected 
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devices. Since the 1990's companies have incorporated security in their network 
infrastructure by means of firewalls, detection systems and its derivatives. 
These types of systems have emerged because it is increasingly difficult to determine if 
an information system will be free of vulnerabilities. Ladnwehr [6] shows that 
information systems suffer from security vulnerabilities regardless of their purpose, 
manufacturer or origin and that is it technically difficult as well as economically costly to 
ensure that they are not susceptible to attacks. 
In addition, certain environments must also compose with legacy devices that 
communicate using non-standard or basic client-server protocols. 
The common security measure was to permit the communication, without any 
regards as to if the protocol semantics were followed or even the correct methods were 
used. When once a proxy-application based firewalled was suitable, other factors such as 
performance and compatibility came into play. With the advent of packet filtering we 
also inherited its drawbacks, one of which was not inspecting packets for protocol 
correctness. Under a packet filter, a rule permitting "telnet" for example could easily be a 
covert channel bridging the entire network to the internet, where as a proxy-application 
based firewall could not be deceived so easily. 
1.3 Terminology 
The term covert channel is used to refer to the hiding of information in network 
protocols. The information transmitted across the covert channel is referred to as covert 
information. When a transmission of information is conducted over a public channel, we 
can refer to this mechanism as an overt channel. In general, we can state that a covert 
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channel is considered a 'transmission channel that may be used to transfer data in a 
manner that violates security policy'. 
As cited in Ladnwehr [6], covert channels were classified into storage and timing 
channels. 
• Covert storage channels involve the direct or indirect writing to a storage location by 
the sender and the direct or indirect reading of the storage location by the receiver. 
Covert storage channels typically involve a finite resource that is shared by two 
subjects at different security levels. This will be the main type of channel that we will 
address. 
• Covert timing channels involve the sender signaling information to the receiver by 
modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., central processing unit time) in such 
a way that this manipulation affects the real response time observed by the receiver. 
1.4 The prisoners' problem 
The prisoners' problem was first posed by Simmons in 1983 and serves as a model for 
covert channel communication [7]. Two people, Alice and Bob, are thrown into prison 
and intend to escape. To agree on an escape plan they need to communicate, but the 
warden Eve monitors all their messages. If Eve detects any signs of suspicious messages, 
she will place Alice and Bob in solitary confinement making their plan to escape 
impossible and severing all future communications between them. Alice and Bob must 
exchange innocuous messages containing hidden information that should hopefully not 
arouse any suspicion from Eve. According to Craver [8], there are three types of 
wardens: 
• A passive warden can only spy on the channel, but cannot alter any messages. 
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• An active warden is able to slightly modify the messages, but without altering the 
semantic context. 
• A malicious warden may alter the messages at will. 
If we were to transpose this scenario to computer networks, Alice and Bob use two 
computers for communication, the network as a public channel, and transmit two types of 
messages: innocuous plain text (C) messages and covert messages containing escape 
plans (S). Alice and Bob have a share secret key (K), which is useful for determining 
covert channel encoding parameters and encrypting and authenticating covert messages. 
Eve can monitor the passing network traffic for covert channels, slightly modify the 
traffic or even alter the messages being transmitted between Alice and Bob in an attempt 
to unmask their escape plans. The figure 1.1 below describes the model (Alice sending to 
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Figure 1 Alice is sending a message (£) to Bob while trying to evade suspicion from Eve. She has many methods at her 
disposal: a shared secret key (K), a private random source (R), plain text (C) (an overt message) or encrypted cipher text (S) (a 
covert escape plan). Eve can monitor the passing traffic for covert channels, and can even alter the traffic to disrupt. Bob 
must be able to recover E from his knowledge of the cipher text S and from the key K. 
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1.5 A taxonomy for covert channels 
The following taxonomy according to Van Horenbeeck [5] is proposed that 
further differentiates covert channels by objective: 
• Data smuggling: Covert channels can be used to smuggle data into or out of a 
corporate network, in which this data is classified as determined by the security 
policy. The type of data loss prevention is not the focus of this paper. 
• Automated code execution: Covert channels can allow for the transfer and 
execution of code on internal hosts that should not normally be executed 
according to the security policy. 
• Protocol tunnelling: allows internal entities to connect to host and services on the 
internet that are not permitted by the security policy. This technique permits the 
retrieval through permitted protocol and ports, content that would normally pass 
by many layers of protection (anti-virus, content filtering, etc) therefore exposing 
the internal network to a plethora of threats. A more serious threat is the 
establishment of a covert channel tunnel that allow the creation of arbitrary data 
transfer channels in the data streams authorized by a firewall thus permitting a 
"backdoor" for external entities to enter the internal network at will [9]. 
Firewall encoded data 
Client through HTTP Server 
proxy chain 
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Figure 2 A basic setup using the HTTP protocol to circumvent firewall security policies. 
1.6 TCP/IP and Internetworking theory 
In order to fully understand the problem, a full understanding of TCP/IP and 
internetworking are necessary. The infrastructure of the Internet consists of a number of 
routers and interconnected network devices whose function is to forward information 
from its source to its destination. In packet switching networks, routing directs 
forwarding, the transit of logically addressed packets from their source toward their 
ultimate destination through intermediate nodes; typically hardware devices called 
routers, bridges, gateways, firewalls, or switches. Network devices and other devices that 
communicate over the Internet are known as hosts. The Internet is a public packet-
switched network made up of hosts that can send packets onto the network destined for 
any other host. Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) is termed the 
'language of the Internet'. Any device or software that uses TCP/IP can communicate on 
the Internet. Its design is based on five protocol layers, each of which is responsible to 
provide services to layers above it. 
• Physical layer provides the network device with direct access to the transmission 
medium and is also responsible for encoding and decoding signals over this medium , 
such as a wire or an optical fiber; 
• Data link layer logically passes information between two points over the physical 
media, basically moving data across a LAN 
• Network layer is responsible for global addressing and routing packets between 
physical network segments; 
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• Transport layer is responsible for communication between processes, and optionally 
reliable connections 
• Application is responsible for encoding and decoding information in formats 
understood by applications, as well as providing any necessary services not provided 
by lower layers. 
TCP/IP is an open standard that is free, robust and flexible. TCP/IP doesn't specify how 
the Physical and Data Link Layers work; it just expects them to provide enough 
functionality to link two or more network devices together into a Local Area Network. 
That is, because TCP/IP is an Internetwork Protocol suite, it specifies how data can make 
its way from a host on to another host. The Internet Protocol or IP is the standard 
language for the packets that flow across the Internet. Services such as the Web, SMTP, 
and DNS are all built on top of this protocol (IP). 
1.6.1 How Layering Works 
Each layer in the TCP/IP suite operates by using the data portion of the layer above it; 
information being sent is passed down from the application layer to the physical layer. 
Another way of looking at the protocol stack is to start from the highest level and work 
your way down. As the data goes down through the TCP/IP networking layers, 
information specific to that layer is added to the data until it reaches the bottom, at which 
point it is sent out over the communications link (see figure 3). When it is received on the 
other side, the process is reversed, with each layer removing the data specific to that 
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Figure 3: Figure of TCP/IP networking layers from a sending host to a receiving host with intermediating nodes. 
1.6.2 Frames and Packets 
The basic unit of Logical Link Layer data transmission is the frame. The Internet 
Protocol has a similar basic unit of data transmission: the packet. The standard network 
protocol on the Internet is known as the Internet Protocol, version 4 (IPv4) [10]. IP 
provides an unreliable datagram service: it breaks the information that it transmits into 
packets (also known as datagrams) and routes each to its destination independently, but 
provides no guarantees that packets are properly delivered. 
An IP Packet is quite similar in structure to an Ethernet frame, with source and 
destination addresses, packet description and option fields, checksums, and a data 
portion. Because of the way IP is layered on top of the Logical Link Layer, all of the 
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packet structure is nested inside the data portion of the logical link frame (Ethernet, for 
example). 
There are many different types of packets exchanged in a TCP/IP network, starting with 
the ARP and RARP packets and including IP packets. The generic structure of an IP 
packet is illustrated below. 
IP 
Header TCP segment 
1.7 
Frame 



















Figure 4: Figure demonstrating the nesting of the different headers in relation to the different layers, when a user transmits : 
packet. 
1.7.1 The IP Header 
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Bit 0 Bit 32 
4-bit version 4-bit header length 8-bit TOS 16-bit total length in bytes 
16-bit identification 3-bit Flags 13-bit fragment offset 
8-bit Time To Live 8-bit Protocol 16-bit Header Checksum 
32-bit Source IP Address 
32-bit Destination IP Address 
Options (if any) 
Data 
Figure 5: An IP packet has a header that includes the source and destination IP addresses, version, type, and service 
information, options, and a data section. 
As shown in the above figure, the IP header is typically 20 bytes long, but can be up to 60 
bytes long if the packet includes IP options. The non-optional fields are as follows: 
Version These four bits identify which version of IP generated the packet. The current IP 
version is 4. 
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Header length This four-bit value is the number of 32-bit words in the header, and by 
default is 20. 
Precedence (TOS) These eight bits are an early attempt at implementing quality of 
service for IP. They are comprised of three bits for packet precedence (ignored by 
modern implementations of IP), four Type of Service bits, and a bit to be left at zero. 
Only one of the four Type of Service bits can be turned on. The four bits are: minimize 
delay, maximize throughput, maximize reliability, and minimize cost. All zeros mean the 
network should use normal priority in processing the packet. RFCs 1340 and 1349 
specify TOS use. Most implementations of IP don't allow the application to set the TOS 
value for the communicated data, which limits the usefulness of this field. 
Datagram Length This is the total length of the IP datagram in bytes. Since this is a 16-
bit field, the maximum IP packet size is 165535 bytes in length, even if the Data Link 
Layer frame could accommodate a larger packet. 
Identification To guarantee that packets are unique and to assist in the reassembly of 
data streams that have been broken down into packets, the sending computer numbers the 
packets, incrementing the value when each packet is sent. This value doesn't have to start 
at zero, and isn't necessarily incremented by one on all implementations of IP. 
Flags Flags define whether or not this packet is a fragment of a larger packet. 
Fragment Offset This defines where in the chain of fragments this fragment belongs 
when reassembling a fragmented packet. 
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Time To Live This declares the number of routers through which the packet may pass 
before it is dropped. This prevents packets from getting caught in routing loops. This 
field is typically set to 32 or 64. When a packet is dropped due to TTL expiring, an ICMP 
message is sent to the sender. 
Protocol This field shows which IP protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.) generated the 
packet and should be the recipient of it at the destination. 
Header Checksum All of the 16-bit values in the packet header are summed together 
using one's complement addition and placed in this field. 
Source This is the device sending the IP packet. 
Destination This is the intended recipient of the IP packet. 
Network Byte Order (Big Endian) 
Internet Protocol packets are sent in Network Byte Order, where the most significant bit 
of a word is sent first. For example, the 32-bit word OxDEADBEEF would have the byte 
OxDE sent first, and the byte OxEF sent last. For this reason, Network byte order is also 
called Big-Endian. In contrast, in Little-Endian byte ordering, the least significant bits are 
sent first. 
1.7.2 Transport Layers 
A number of transport layers exist, each providing different services. ICMP ("Internet 
Control Message Protocol") is used for delivering many types of error message from the 
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network and transport layers as well as performing a variety of administrative functions 
[11]. UDP ("User Datagram Protocol") provides an unreliable datagram service between 
applications [12]; the only important feature that it adds to IP is application addressing. 
TCP ('Transmission Control Protocol"), the most common transport protocol on the 
Internet, provides reliable bidirectional streams between applications. Other transport 
protocols exist, providing other services. TCP breaks streams down into segments which 
are then encapsulated into IP Packets. Like IP packets, TCP segments contain both 
headers and payload data. TCP assigns sequence numbers to every byte of payload data 
sent and requires that every byte be acknowledged; if any segments are lost or corrupted, 
either they will be resent or an error will be detected. Duplicate and out-of-order packets 
can also be detected and corrected using the sequence numbers. TCP headers contain 
application-layer addresses, data and acknowledgement sequence numbers, and control 
flags, among other fields. Segments used to initiate connections have the SYN 
("synchronize") flag set; those used to finalize connections have the FIN flag set. The 
ACK flag indicates that a segment is acknowledging data received from the other end of 
the connection. Opening a TCP connection requires that both endpoints exchange initial 
sequence numbers (ISNs) using an algorithm known as the three-way handshake, shown 
in Figure 1.6. 
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Hostl Host 2 Hostl Host 2 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6: TCP connection establishment handshake 
The client starts the handshake by choosing an ISN and sending it to the server in a 
segment with the SYN flag set. If the server chooses to accept the connection, it responds 
with its own ISN in a segment carrying the SYN flag; it also signals that it received the 
client's ISN by setting its acknowledgement number to the client's ISN plus one and 
setting the ACK flag. The client then acknowledges receipt of the server's ISN with an 
ACK segment carrying the server's ISN plus one in its acknowledgement number field. 
After completing this exchange, a TCP connection is established and both the client and 
server can send and receive data. 
Both TCP and UDP use ports for addressing applications. A port is simply a 
16-bit integer where any application can bind itself to listen and send packets. Some 
operating systems restrict the port range that can be used by "user land" applications. It is 
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common for ports < 1024 to be used exclusively for services offered by the operating 
system. For instance, SSH ("Secure Shell", used for secure remote logins, file transfer, 
and tunneling other protocols) servers typically listen on port 22/TCP, HTTP (used for 
retrieving documents from web servers) uses port 80/TCP, and DNS ("Domain Name 
System", responsible for mapping easy-to-remember names to numeric IP addresses) 
servers listen on port 53/UDP. On most operating systems, applications use the socket 
interface to send and receive messages. Unprivileged applications are typically limited to 
using TCP and UDP; headers, with the exception of addressing information, are 
automatically generated by the operating system, as are TCP connection establishment 
and finalization messages. Privileged applications can use the raw socket interface to 
generate arbitrary packets [13]. 
Neither IPv4, TCP, nor UDP provide any authentication or privacy services; any 
host can generate any packet and any host observing packets at the network layer can 
read the packets' payloads. If these services are important, then they can be provided by 
application-layer protocols, TCP extensions such as TLS [14], IP extensions such as 
IPSec [15], or the next-generation Internet Protocol, IPv6 [16]. 
1.8 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized in the following chapters. Some basic concepts, terminology, and 
TCP/IP and internetworking concepts have been introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 is a 
background study of early defense mechanisms, weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol and 
current countermeasures and some current methods on detection. In Chapter 3, we 
present our approach of anomaly based detection and profiling to be used for detecting a 
very precise subset of covert storage channels in certain network protocols. Chapter 4 and 
16 
5 discuss implementation and a performance evaluation. Finally the conclusion and 




2.1 Introduction - Early defence mechanisms 
The first line of defence consisted of deploying firewalls and restricting the network 
traffic allowed to enter or leave local networks by defining interior and exterior 
interfaces, while still allowing approved traffic to pass. This was to be done at the 
network level in routers and firewalls that would provide the intended connectivity to the 
Internet. Firewall technologies were not abundant, and very few firewall policies would 
implement egress filtering. Perimeters were established, delimitating zones to leave the 
intruders "out", and DMZ zones offered services that the "public" internet user can 
utilize, namely http, mail and ftp services. Firewalls knew that if a packet proclaims to 
come from the "internal" network and is received on an external interface, something was 
definitely wrong. The best practice would be to allow traffic that is explicitly permitted 
while blocking everything else, taking as parameters source, destination, port and 
protocol. In actuality, there is much more detailed information being exchanged. 
One type of firewall technology, network layer firewalls or also called packet filters [17]; 
work on the low-level of the TCP/IP protocol stack and attempt to filter inbound and 
outbound traffic by restricting the ports to which users may connect. As an example, 
disallowing outbound connections to anything except TCP ports 80 (HTTP), 443 
(HTTPS), and 20 and 21 (FTP) would be a standard policy in most corporate 
environments. This may provide a false sense of security, because services may be setup 
on non standard ports on a remote host (such as the secure shell service on port 443 
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instead of 22 for example), and the firewall would allow for this type of connection to 
persist. 
A form of packet filtering named "Deep Packet Inspection" examines the data and 
header part of the packet searching for protocol non-compliance, viruses, malicious code, 
SPAM and other threats or any other predefined criteria to decide if the packet can pass 
or not. This is in contrast to stateful packet inspection which only validates the header 
portion of a packet [18], after which an initial check is passed; a flow is stored in a table 
so that quick routing of subsequent packets can occur. These packets are not inspected for 
malicious content. 
With the ability to inspect Layers 2 through 7 of the OSI model, Deep Packet Inspection 
[19] seems like a promising new method to identify and classify traffic based on 
signatures-based comparisons, packet flows, heuristic, statistical, or anomaly-based 
techniques, or some combination of these. The idea was to move the inspection of the 
data in packets to the same application that does the packet filtering rather than have this 
task offloaded on another system. 
Application-layer firewalls work on the application layer of the TCP/IP stack and by the 
use of application proxies can easily filter traffic that doesn't match the expected protocol 
or port; they effectively are implementing a correctness check upon the application 
protocols they gateway [20]. When the firewall is inspecting all packets for improper 
content, the task becomes rapidly complex given the variety of applications and the 
diversity of content that can be allowed in each sequence of packets. If we are also to take 
into account performance degradation and the various security flaws in the TCP/IP 
protocol itself, we have as a result, a difficult implementation in any environment. 
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Protocol scrubber or "Traffic normalisation": This approach consists of an active 
interposition mechanism that attempts to homogenize network flows by identifying and 
removing attacks in real-time. The difference in this approach is to continuously remove 
malicious content in the traffic flow by normalising protocol headers, padding and 
extensions as described by Malan et al. [21], Handley et al. [22] and Fisk et al. [23] for 
the lifetime of the flow. This approach does have its merit, but has the same weakness as 
described for application-firewalls, namely network traffic disruption and degradation. 
The main weak point of this approach would be the handling of "non-well-behaved" 
clients which would have their flows tampered with and also suffer the corresponding 
packet loss given that the scrubber throws away any packets that could lead to 
inconsistencies [21]. It has been our experience that any tool that is actively interposing 
itself in a production environment, i.e. modifying traffic flows and subsequently breaking 
applications face a certain security vs. usability debate. We prefer to use a passive 
approach in an active production environment with IDS evasion detection techniques and 
anomalous network flows in mind. 
2.2 Weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol 
Security was not an integral part of the TCP/IP design process and it has been 
determined that many flaw and design weaknesses exist. A model of TCP/IP networks in 
regard to some well-known security threats is presented in [24]. This model characterizes 
the topology of TCP/IP security to enable a better understanding of the related 
vulnerabilities. A classic paper, [25] points out serious security flaws in the TCP/IP 
protocol suite with details on a variety of attacks. 
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For instance, the protocols governing TCP/IP are not designed to ensure integrity of the 
messages being transferred. An important weakness of IP packets is that they contain no 
strong authentication information; therefore hosts usually cannot distinguish between 
packets sent by an authorized user and packets sent by an unauthorized intruder. 
For example, the IP option of source routing (loose source routing) in the IP header is 
controlled by the sender. This is problematic, because the sender of a packet can specify 
the route that a packet should take through the network. An attacker needs only to send a 
single valid packet for that new route to be used for the entire TCP connection. This 
means that an otherwise unreachable device can now be reached by a specified route by 
the attacker; however we must note that this type of attack is less effective when 
performed on the Internet. 
Another weakness in the protocol is masquerading as another host via IP spoofing. 
Sequence number prediction is a fatal flaw that permits an attacker to masquerade as 
another host and therefore abuse trust relationships. A Secure Networks Inc paper details 
the flaw in detail [26]. 
Protocols used to distribute routing information and map physical addresses to IP 
addresses on local networks are not secure, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate 
traffic destined to other hosts [25],[27]. Furthermore, flaws in the ICMP Router 
Discovery Protocol have no form of authentication, therefore by spoofing IRDP Router 
Advertisements, and attacker can remotely add default route entries to a remote system. 
Hosts trusting ICMP messages are vulnerable to the same kinds of attack enabled by 
source routing [28]. 
IP and TCP packets can be fragmented at (almost) arbitrary boundaries, allowing 
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attackers to split attack signatures between multiple packets. Furthermore, IP fragments 
and TCP segments are allowed to overlap; it is up to the receiver to decide how to re-
assemble them. As a result, firewalls and detection systems that re-assemble streams 
before checking them may miss attacks against hosts that use different re-assembly 
strategies [29]. 
Another type of attack is by altering the TTL of IP packets; it is possible to make the 
detection system see packets that will not arrive at the target of the attack. By inserting 
fake data into the stream, an attacker can interleave the attack with bogus information, 
thus hiding the attack from the detection system while the target correctly reconstructs 
this attack data and reacts to it. 
2.3 Payload tunnelling 
A tunnel acts as a relay point between two connections without changing the messages; 
tunnels are used when the communication needs to pass through an intermediary (such as 
a firewall) even when the intermediary cannot understand the contents of the messages. 
Various protocols exist that allow IP packets to be encapsulated inside protocols that run 
on top of IP. This encapsulation of protocols is known as tunnelling. These types of 
channels are especially useful to circumvent firewalls that limit outbound traffic to only a 
few select application protocols, a security problem that is quite present in corporate 
networks today. For example, an attacker can use a non-HTTP protocol to transfer and 
steal information because the firewalls cannot provide additional assurance that another 
protocol is not being used on an HTTP port. 
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One of the first tunnelling techniques to appear was Loki, an approach that tunnelled data 
in the payload of ICMP echo messages [30]. Similar approaches were implemented by 
Stodle [31] and Zelenchuk [32], the later using an indirect approach with a bounce host. 
Later approaches to tunnelling included HTTP tunnelling where a tool was developed by 
Padgett [33] to tunnel SSH over HTTP proxies. Subsequent refinements where also 
developed by Dyatlov and LeBoutillier where their implementation provided tools to 
tunnel UDP or TCP over HTTP [34], [35]. As an interesting side note, Lundstrom 
implemented a tool named "MailTunnel" that can establish a bidirectional tunnel over the 
exchange of email [34]. Indeed, interesting methods of tunnelling have been engineered 
over the years, namely covert channels in the IP ID and sequence number fields of TCP/IP 
headers [37], tunnelling TCP connections to a remote host using ICMP echo request and 
reply packets [38], tunnelling using only acknowledgement packets [39], [40] or portions 
of TCP and IP Headers [41] and finally IP tunnels using DNS queries and replies for IP 
packet encapsulation [42]. A tool even exists to allowing the creation of arbitrary data 
transfer channels in the data streams authorized by a network access control system [43], 
[44]. Network covert shells have been used by attackers to communicate with 
compromised hosts, particularly in distributed denial of service attacks [45]. Many tools 
exist for setting up these shells using a variety of protocols including TCP, IP, HTTP, 
ICMP, AODV, and MAC [46]-[54]. Common practice is to encapsulate information in a 
legitimate protocol to bypass firewalls and content filters. 
There are legitimate examples of tunnelling that are well documented and would be in 
accordance to the network's stated security policy. For instance, IPSec (a security 
architecture for IP) [15] can create encrypted tunnels for IP and other network protocols 
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on top of IP, whereas GRE ("Generic Routing Encapsulation") [55] can create plain-text 
tunnels. What our tool will attempt to identify are specific unauthorized tunnels that do 
not comply with the network's stated security policy. 
2.4 Countermeasures and network security 
In the production environments that we have examined, possible countermeasures include 
blocking unnecessary ports and protocols at network boundaries or at least limiting the 
destinations of particular permitted protocol and port. 
An example would be to use egress filtering on the ICMP protocol, a common measure 
that is used to mostly prevent DoS type attacks originating from servers and clients inside 
the network. It also happens to prevent a particular type of covert channel as described by 
daemon9 with his tool Loki [30], PingTunnel [31] and Skeeve [32]. 
A Split-DNS architecture is used to limit outgoing DNS requests from only a few name 
servers internally and treating external requests with bastioned DNS servers with limited 
public DNS records. This setup limits techniques that could be used such as DNS tunnel 
[56]. 
Techniques such as bouncing covert channels as specified by Rowland [57] are easily 
thwarted by good router hygiene and appropriate egress/ingress filtering. 
As described by Padlipsky [58], securing networks against wiretapping and securing 
routers against compromise prevents some covert channel scenarios in which covert 
senders or receivers act as middlemen [58]. 
Very few countermeasures exist for preventing covert channels on permitted protocols 
and ports, HTTP for example. This has led to many tools being available [33]-[35] to 
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circumvent security policies [59] and has also fueled different approaches on how to 
detect this problem. 
2.5 Research on detection 
Historically, three main detection approaches exist. The signature-based approach 
involves building and updating a signatures database and notifying the administrator 
when a known signature is found in the network data streams. The protocol-based 
approach focuses on protocol anomalies or violations and incases the monitored 
communications turn out to be "abnormal", the operator is notified. The behavior-based 
approach involves creating behavioral user profiles (users, workstations, servers, network 
streams, etc.) and using statistical methods to determine if the observed data stream is 
suspicious [60]. Detecting covert channels are desirable to discourage the use of these 
channels and secondly, it is widely recognized that covert channels are impossible to 
eliminate entirely, even in highly optimized network protocols [61]. It is therefore crucial 
to monitor their activity. 
While there are known techniques for detecting covert channels in layer 3 and 4 protocols 
[62], [63], and [64], very few exist for layer 7 channels. 
In one approach, Schear et al. [65] proposed eliminating covert channels in HTTP 
responses by enforcing RFC protocol-compliant behavior and restricting usable response 
headers to a fixed set in a particular order, and by verifying response header fields against 
the corresponding object metadata and client request. 
Sohn et al. [66]-[68] used a Support Vector Machine based approach to evaluate 
the accuracy of detecting covert channels embedded in ICMP echo packets and 
identification field of IP header and the sequence number field of TCP header. 
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Techniques on data hiding in IP fields can be found here [69]. While our interest is 
detecting covert channels in the payload channel, Sohn et al. did achieved classification 
accuracies of up to 99 percent when training a classifier on normal and abnormal packets 
generated by Loki [30]. Murdoch [70] argues that 
TCP and IP specifications exhibit sufficient structure to define what is normal, and that 
learning methods such as SVM are overkill and they present a suite of tests to detect 
whether the IP ID and TCP ISN generating processes are in compliance with the 
specifications. 
Pack et al. proposed detecting HTTP tunnels by using behavior profiles of traffic 
flows [71]. This type of approach is independent from payload inspection and is based 
on social behavior of hosts by looking at their connection patterns [72]-[74]. Profiles are 
based on a number of metrics such as the average packet size, ratio of small and large 
packets, change of packet size patterns, total number of packets sent/received, and 
connection duration. If the behavior of a flow under observation deviates from the normal 
HTTP behavior profile it is likely to be an HTTP tunnel. 
Borders et al. developed a tool for detecting covert channels over outbound HTTP 
tunnels based on a similar approach [75]. It analyses HTTP traffic over a training period, 
and is then able to detect abnormal HTTP flows using metrics such as request size, 
request regularity, time between requests, time of the day, and outbound bandwidth 
usage. Other similar approaches have also been developed by Crotti [76] and Erman [77]. 
Hjelmvik et al. [78] developed a statistical protocol identification algorithm 
utilizing various statistical flow and application layer data features in order to identify 
application layer protocols by comparison of probability vectors to protocol models of 
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known protocols. Although the results are preliminary, their approach is to use a hybrid 
technique, utilizing efficient generic attributes, which can include deep packet inspection 
elements and treating them the same way as statistical flow properties. 
Cabuk et al. [79]-[81] investigated the detection of a class of network covert 
channels that use the timing of IP packets to transmit a secret message over the network. 
Their detection scheme used compressibility and showed that we were able to distinguish 
the covert channel traffic from WWW, FTP-Data, and SSH traffic with more than 95% 
detection rates. It was noted that more regular the data set, the higher the compressibility. 
Their results show that the compressibility scores for the SSH, WWW, and FTP-Data 
data sets are much less than IP simple covert channel compressibility scores. 
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3 Chapter 3 
3.1 Proposed method 
In order to classify our proposed method, we have used the dual approach of knowledge -
based (often referred to as misuse detection [82], [83]) for detecting specific anomalies 
and streams-based intrusion detection (often referred to as anomaly detection [82]) for 
our covert channel profiling. Anomaly detection is usually based on a model of 
acceptable patterns. The model is obtained either through a learning process [5], [84] or 
given a priori [85], [86]. The incoming events are then compared with the model. If they 
deviate from the model, they are considered anomalous. If the model is too sensitive it 
will produce many false alarms and if its configuration is too lax it will miss attacks. We 
have not taken the model approach, and for performance and versatility considerations, 
opted for the signature and protocol based approach. It would be difficult to model any 
and every new unusual traffic pattern, our approach would consistently be try to learn and 
constant human interaction would require us to calibrate the model to avoid false 
positives. 
It has been shown that higher connectivity bandwidths and growing numbers of Internet 
users also lead to increased misuse and anomalous behavior [87]. It has also been shown 
that unusual traffic patterns may lead to discovery of covert shells that employ packet 
headers. For example, multiple ping requests within a small time interval may indicate 
the presence of an ICMP covert shell such as Loki [30]. In addition, covert shells can be 
detected by observing an anomaly in unused packet header fields [22]. According to 
Cabuk [79] these schemes have been fairly successful in detecting covert shells but none 
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can detect the type of covert channels that use packet timings in distributed systems. This 
is because in such systems packet headers are already protected by policy (i.e., Eve 
cannot access any information that is transmitted using Alice's network packet headers) 
and none of the above schemes address detecting anomalous traffic patterns that can 
potentially be created by a covert channel. It is our opinion that combining anomaly 
detection and covert channel detection can enable us to ascertain a better qualification of 
those events. 
According to Tombini [86], no component so far can be considered 100% correct and 
complete, therefore qualification conflicts arise. EMERALD [88] explicitly handles these 
conflicts through a correlation component. 
By analyzing a TCP/IP communication we can identify the type of traffic, its volume 
and duration, the application and user exchanging it (if it can be determined), the size of 
the payload and its content, and to some extent protocol compliance to RFC's and other 
constraints. The proposed method relies on the capability of examining network traffic 
with regular expressions and packet inspection logic to detect covert channels. The 
system also contains knowledge accumulated about TCP/IP weaknesses and unusual 
traffic patterns and can therefore look for attempts to exploit these weaknesses and raise 
an alarm if such attempts are made. Any action that is not explicitly recognized as 
anomalous , the system logs pending further offline investigation for potential covert 
activity whenever there is suspicion. This poses a problem of scalability that we discuss 
in Chapter 5. 
In terms of accuracy, we can consider this part of our proposed method to be 
acceptable. In terms of completeness, it requires that the system be regularly updated 
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with new knowledge of attacks and unusual traffic patterns. As an advantage, this type of 
system has a very low false-alarm rate, given that it is quite precise and the context can 
























Figure 7: Flow diagram describing four steps to our proposed method: Network capture and reassembly, preliminary analysis 
via preprocessors, packet analysis via rules and output responses. 
3.2 Preprocessor analysis 
The proposed method relies on capturing link layer frames from the network and 
accumulates new packets. Using the TCP and IP preprocessors each IP and TCP packet is 
reassembled to avoid fragmentation attacks. 
Analysis can now begin; the next step is to pass these packets through a series of 
preprocessors for each of the protocols starting by ARP, IP and TCP. A correctness 
check is then enabled by a series of more specialized preprocessors, each having a 
particular purpose that may generate alerts to indicate network's stated security policy 
violations. 
The first specialized preprocessor is the ARP preprocessor. Its purpose is to validate 
the source Ethernet address with the source IP address of an IP datagram to detect 
spoofing. We are shall trigger an alert if an IP datagram with an invalid MAC address is 
detected. This may indicate a misconfigured host or a spoofing attempt. 
The second specialized preprocessor is the IP preprocessor which reassembles 
fragmented IP datagrams into one IP datagram to help analyze its content. Different types 
of situations are of interest here, namely overlapping fragments (two IP fragments 
contained data that overlapped) and an out of bounds datagram (A set of IP fragments 
that would create an IP datagram with a length superior to 65535 bytes if reassembled. 
The third specialized preprocessor is the stream preprocessor, which reassembles TCP 
application data sent in different segments into one continuous buffer to help analyze its 
content. We are looking for suspicious traffic that might indicate an attack or covert 
channel. A possible attack could be detected by analyzing the TCP stream and finding a 
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packet not belonging to any known TCP stream that could be used in stealth scanning. 
Other types of suspicious traffic could be a packet with the TCP SYN flag set or the TCP 
SYN and ACK flags set contained in application data. A similar attempt would be a 
packet with TCP RST flag set. This would violate protocol semantics, because this type 
of packet simply doesn't exist in the wild. 
A particular reassembly evasion attempt exists where two packets contained 
overlapping data did not match. This is frequently used in reassembly evasion attempt. 
Here is an example of this type of evasion: 
Let's suppose that a detection system has a rule which searches for the string 
"/php/finger.cgi" to protect a finger script on a web server. An attacker then establishes a 
connection to this web server and sends 4 TCP segments: 
TCP sequence 100: get /p 
TCP sequence 107: p/finger. cgi http/1.1 
TCP sequence 106: a (doesn't make it to web server because of a low TTL) 
TCP sequence 106: h (accepted by web server) 
The resulting data seen by a detection system should be "get /pap/finger, cgi http/1.1" 
which will not trigger the rule. However, our proposed implementation intends to detect 
and report the overlap to help discover what an attacker really did. 
Another type of attack is when two packets having the same sequence numbers 
have flags which could not have been sent in the order which they were received. This 
can happen if an attacker sends a TCP packet with the TCP RST or the TCP FIN flag set 
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and then continues sending data. An attack also exists where application data was sent 
with a sequence number greater than a TCP FIN or a TCP RST. 
Two other conditions exist that should be considered an anomaly, where TCP 
application data was sent by a host which previously sent an RST and application data 
was sent with a sequence number greater than a TCP FIN. This can happen if an attacker 
sends a TCP packet with the TCP FIN flag set and then continues sending data. 
3.3 Protocol profiling, sanitization and packet analysis 
The second part of the preliminary analysis concerns particular protocol profiling and 
sanitization. An http preprocessor translates escaped characters in HTTP requests into 
their equivalent so they can be searched by content filters; the same also applies to the 
telnet protocol. The RPC preprocessor reassembles fragmented RPC traffic so it can be 
searched by content filters. 
The next step consists of packet analysis; we intend to use rules to filter by 
keywords by using a simple syntax to achieve our purpose. Covert channels on any of the 
following protocols (ftp, telnet, http, smtp) will be detected by a variety of metrics. For 
example, a criterion for clear text protocols (not using any encryption) is the statistical 
distribution of characters that the protocol semantics demands. For example, normal http 
traffic is composed of a series of methods and standard responses. Indications of non-
RFC compliance and statistical deviations would indicate that the conversation may not 
in fact be HTTP, but a probable convert channel. In our tests, we have defined a lower 
limit threshold of eighty percent compliance to protocol RFC's to be reliable. 
3.4 Profiling characteristics 
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As an example, profiling characteristics of a telnet session for example would be 
comprised of a defined set of characters, small client-to-server packets and known RFC 
methods. The FTP protocol would also be composed of a defined set of characters, small 
client to server packets and a defined inactivity period. Here too the methods are known. 
Other indicators, such as a high payload size might also indicate that the client is 
executing http requests but in fact establishing a steady stream of data transfer. This 
combined with the duration of the connection with a particular site should be sufficient to 
determine a convert tunnel with a high level of probability. 
In general there are three classes of countermeasures: eliminating the covert channel, 
limiting the covert channel capacity and deterring potential users by demonstrating easy 
detection of the covert channel [90]. 
In our proposed method, we intend to demonstrate easy detection with rules to filter by 
keywords and using a simple syntax to achieve our purpose. Eliminating the channel is 
impossible, and limiting the channel capacity could be an option once the channel is 
identified. A QoS mesure could be attributed to the network flow, but this study isn't in 
the scope of this paper. 
Covert channels on any of the following protocols (ftp, telnet, http, smtp) will be 
detected by a variety of metrics. For example, a criterion for clear text protocols (not 
using any encryption) is the statistical distribution of characters that the protocol 
semantics demands. Standard http traffic is composed of a series of methods (GET, 
HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, CONNECT) and standard responses. 
Indications of non-rfc compliance and statistical deviations would indicate that the 
conversation may not in fact be HTTP, but a probable convert channel. Our approach is 
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similar to Schear et al. [65] but it isn't as intrusive and disruptive. While interesting, the 
approach is rather intrusive for it must act as a network bridge at the perimeter network. 
Interposing another device in a chain of proxies and firewalls that can affect traffic flow 
complicates thing considerably for large scale corporate networks, especially in terms of 
interoperability and performance. The vetting process is noteworthy, in that it prevents 
the transmission of data either overtly in the payload channel of layer 7 protocols such as 
HTTP or FTP or in hidden covert channels in the protocol channel of these protocols. 
Unfortunately, it is also impractical in that no data can be transferred if it hasn't be 
vetted; a condition that simply cannot be applied in existing corporate networks. Also, the 
approach towards verification of HTTPS by performing in-line decryption of all traffic 
raises particular privacy concerns for regular corporate employees. Our approach must be 
examined further and is a consideration for future work. 
3.5 Case: Tunneling 
For example, tunneling (which is used to describe when one network protocol called the 
"payload protocol" is encapsulated within a different protocol) various protocols through 
port 80 or 443, normally used for HTTP/HTTP S traffic, has become quite common and 
well documented [91], [92], [93]. Even in the case of an application-layer firewall, the 
tunneling tool [94] evades suspicion by using correct protocol semantics, for example: an 
SSH connection tunneled through the HTTP protocol would look like this: 






Consequently, the correctness check has become less of a guarantee of security because 
the protocol is followed and the application-layer firewall cannot discern a disguised 
query from a legitimate one (a network-layer firewall wouldn't even bother to look at the 
protocol semantics). In addition, these tunneling tools provide encryption which renders 
most application layer filters useless. In essence, how can we assure that the traffic that 
is generated from a host is indeed what the firewall is permitted to pass? If two hosts can 
communicate, fundamentally, they will be able to transmit and receive information as 
they please, by covert channel or otherwise. The use of Active Wardens in an attempt to 
remove, modify or detect any carriers of covert channels [95] was examined, but later 
dismissed given the unverified results on network traffic and legacy applications. The 
concept of Minimal Requisite Fidelity, discussed in [96], describes a method for network 
applications to slightly alter or distort live data passing through them in an attempt to 
disrupt covert channels. 
A distinct possibility exists for violating a security perimeter and bypassing the security 
controls entirely by tunneling a connection from outside the security perimeter in. The 
following paper explores the subject in detail [97]. We believe that our proposed method 
and consequent implementation can partially answer this question. 
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4 Chapter 4 
4.1 Implementation 
Our implementation is the creation of a passive monitoring tool. It is a hybrid between a 
covert channel detection mechanism and an anomaly detector. By capturing link layer 
frames from the network, it provides the ability to detect known attacks via signatures, to 
collect statistics, to provide evidence of intrusion and to warn the security administrator 
in real time of any attack that might be disrupting the network's activities. The tool, 
named Syncd, can operate in an IP-less mode, meaning that the interface on which it 
listens has no IP address, but can still retrieve packets on the network. This phantom 
loghost prevents intruders from sending packets to it in an attempt to destroy the logs. 
4.2 Packet backlog 
Syncd has a special feature called the packet backlog. When a packet is logged, its 
characteristics are kept on the packet backlog. If another similar packet is logged on the 
same network within a predetermined amount of time, then it will not be logged and no 
message will be produced. When the packet exits the packet backlog, a message is 
produced telling how often it was repeated. This protects against flooding of messages 
and packets logs if there is a flood of packet on the network. 
4.3 Network capture 
Syncd can monitor a number of networks simultaneously and has an enhanced scripting 
language which permits system administrators to write rules to log suspicious activities 
and allow normal network traffic. It includes a tool called ipacket which permits 
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inspection of logged packets using rules from the same scripting language. It can be 
configured with multiple configuration files to facilitate having a different configuration 
and a different set of rules for each one of the networks it monitors. Furthermore, packets 
can branch to secondary rulesets for further inspection after matching a particular rule. It 
can respond to a matching rule by: sending SNMP traps (this feature also works in IP-less 
mode), sending a message to syslog or to a file, logging the packet and sending a message 
to syslog or to a file, executing a program, stopping packets from being processed by the 
other rules, branching to another ruleset for further inspection, reassembling packets into 
a TCP stream, and, finally, doing nothing. 
4.4 Embedded security features 
Syncd can detect many types of network flood and can reassemble fragmented IP 
datagram and detect IP fragmentation denial of service attacks. Syncd can protect against 
ARP cache poisoning and can detect unauthorized TCP daemons accepting incoming 
connections. It can differentiate incoming traffic from outgoing traffic. This permits 
treating packets differently depending on if they come from the local network or not. 
Syncd has the possibility of reassembling TCP streams and detects many TCP stream 
reassembly evasion attempts. It also includes a tool named istream which permits 
inspection of TCP streams logged because of suspicious activities. 
4.5 Summary of special features 
Syncd distinguishes itself from other available tools with unique features such as: 
• Covert channel detection: Syncd creates stream profiles to detect if transmitted 
data on HTTP, HTTPS, TELNET, SMTP and FTP ports is regular traffic or a 
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covert channel. 
• ARP and IP spoofing detection: Syncd can detect IP datagrams coming from 
wrong Ethernet addresses. 
• IP fragmentation attacks detection: Syncd can detect overlapping IP fragments. 
• TCP streaming evasion detection: Syncd can detect many complex evasion 
attempts. 
• Flexible flood protection: Syncd can be configured to detect virtually any kind of 
traffic or packet flood to hosts or networks. 
• Syncd does not require the libpcap library. 
Furthermore, it incorporates many features found in similar tools such as: 
• HTTP Unicode decoding 
• RPC defragmentation 
• TELNET escape code removal in TCP streams 
• Flexible logging of messages and packets to a SNMP server, a MySQL database, 
a text file, a binary packet file and or to syslog. If syncd logs to a MySQL 
database, any interface such as can be used to view the generated alerts and 
packets. 
4.6 Understanding rulesets 
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4.6.1 Comments 
Comment lines must start with a "#" and finish at the end of the line. 
# This is a comment 
This is not # and neither is this 
4.6.2 Interface 
Interfaces are of Ethernet type and are declared in the following way: "interface name". 
interface leO 
will declare the interface named leO to be used by Syncd. 
4.6.3 Include files 
Files can be included using the 'include "filename'" command. The filename must be 
surrounded by quotes. 
include "dns-server.rules" 
will include the file named dns-server.rules in the ruleset. 
4.6.4 Variables 
Variables are declared using the following format: "var name value" 
var dns server 10.0.0.2 
alert tcp from any any -> $dns_server any (flags: S; msg:"TCP connection to DNS 
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server";) 
is equivalent to alert tcpfrom any any -> 10.0.0.2 any (flags: S; msg:"TCP connection to 
DNS server";) 
4.6.5 General format 
The general format of a rule is the following: 
ACTION PROTOCOL SOURCEJP SOURCE PORT DIRECTION 
DESTINATIONS DESTINATION PORT (FILTERS) 
ACTION is one or many actions which will take place if the rule matches. It can be any 
user-defined ruletype (explained in the next section) or the keyword drop. The keyword 
drop is used to stop the packet from being processed by other rules. It can thus be used to 
let packets only match one rule or to setup rules which will stop normal traffic from being 
processed by following rules. 
PROTOCOL is the packet protocol to be used. It can be tcp or udp or ip or icmp 
SOURCE JP is the source IP address to be used. It can be a single IP address such as 
1.2.3.4 or a list of bracket-surrounded and comma-separated IPs such as [1.2.3.4,1.2.3.5]. 
Furthermore, netmasks can be applied to IPs such as 1.2.3.0/24 or 1.2.3.0/255.255.255.0 
and a negation operator / can be added to match any other IP !5.6.7.8. These can be 
combined to select almost any range of IPs '.[1.2.3.0/24,1.2.4.1]. 
SOURCEPORT is the TCP or UDP source port to be used. It can be a single port such 
as 1024 or a range of ports like 21:25. The negation operator / can also be added to 
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ports. It must be noted that ranges such as .1023 would select any port from 0 to 1023 
and 50000: would select any port from 50000 to 65535. 
DIRECTION is the direction in which packets are going. It can be -> to indicate that 
packets must be coming from SOURCE to DESTINATION, <> to indicate that packets 
can be coming from SOURCE to DESTINATION or DESTINATION to SOURCE and 
<- to indicate that packets must be coming from DESTINATION to SOURCE. 
DESTINATION IP is the destination IP address to be used. It has the same format as 
SOURCE IP. 
DESTINATION PORT is the TCP or UDP destination port to be used. It has the same 
format as SOURCEjPORT 
FILTERS is one or many filters described in the following section. These filters must be 
surrounded by parentheses, even if there is no filter present. 
Here are two examples: 
warning tcp from 11.2.3.0/24 any to 1.2.3.5 80 ( ) 
info icmp from any any to 6.7.0.0/16 any (itype: 0; icode: 8; msg: "Echo request"; ) 
The first rule will trigger on any TCP segment from any host not in the 1.2.3.0/24 
network on any port to host 1.2.3.5 on port 80. There are no filter present, so there is no 
message defined for the alert and no further tests are performed before triggering the 
warning action. 
The second rule will trigger on any ICMP datagram from any host to any host in the 
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6.7.0.0/16 network with ICMP type 0 and ICMP code 8 (which is an echo request). The 
message of the alert will be Echo request and the info action will be triggered. 
4.6.6 Ruletype 





where name is the name of the action to declare and output-statements is a list of output 
commands (described in the next section) on separated lines. Comments are not allowed 
inside the braces. 
4.6.7 Output 
There are currently 5 different output types that can be used by syncd: packet, syslog, 
message, snmpvl and database. Each type is different and will log events in a particular 
way: 
packet: receives packets logged 
message: receives alerts in text format 
syslog: receives alerts in text format 
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database: log packets that triggered a rule which contains a sid and a rev field in a 
database (currently, only MySQL is supported) 
snmpvl: sends SNMPvl traps containing alerts in text format 
Here is how they are configured: 
output packet: filename 
where filename is the file which will receive packets logged 
output message '.filename 
where filename is the file which will receive alerts in text format 
output syslog: facility 
where facility is the syslog facility which will receive alerts in text format. Available 
facilities are: auth, cron, daemon, kern, Ipr, mail, news, syslog, usr, uucp, localO, local!, 
local!, locali, local4, locals, local6 and local7. 
output database: type_str, sensor_name=,seMsor_sfr" dbname=</6_sfr- user=user_str 
password=passwordstr host=host_str port=port_str 
where type str is the database type (which can only be mysql for the moment), sensor str 
is a unique name for the machine on which Syncd is running, dbstr is the name of the 
database to log to, user str is the user to use to log on the database, password str it the 
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password to use to log on the database, hostjstr is the host on which the database is 
running and port str is the port on which to connect on the host. 
output snmpvl: commumty=community_str portdstr=portdst_str i\)src=ipsrc_str 
ipdst=ipdst_str 
where community str is the name of the community to use, portdst_str is the port to send 
traps to, ipsrcjstr is the IP of the machine on which Syncd is running and ipdststr is the 
machine to which SNMPvl traps should be sent. 
A very basic configuration is: 
ruletype alert 
{ 
output packet: /var/log/Syncd/packet 
output message: /var/log/Syncd/message 
} 
This will log alerts in text format in /var/log/message for human-analysis and packets 
logged in /var/log/packet for further analysis using ipacket if necessary. 
4.6.8 Mandatory ruletypes 
Syncd allows the user to specify where system messages (such as startup and termination 
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notices) should be sent. Furthermore, it also allows the user to specify where 
preprocessor messages should be sent. Syncd thus reserves the following ruletype names 
for output redirection: 
syncd: system message such as startup, termination or possible error messages 
stream : stream preprocessor messages 
defrag : IP defragmentation preprocessor messages 
arp : arpvalidate preprocessor messages 
http : HTTP decode preprocessor messages 
It must be noted that if a preprocessor is used, a corresponding ruletype must be declared 
or alerts will not be reported. A warning will however be given to the user. 
Example of output configuration 
This is an example of configuration that could be setup. Here, syslog could use remote 
logging to send important message to a host monitored by a system administrator (thus, 
he would receive alerts, system messages and preprocessor alerts). The stream 
preprocessor, which can generate more false alarms and which is more useful in post-
incident analysis if any stream reassembly evasion techniques are used, sends it messages 




output message: /var/log/Syncdf/messages 
output packet: /var/log/Syncdf/messages_packet 
output database: mysql, sensor_name-dmz 
dbname=user=password=host=10.4.4.2 port=6000 








output message: /var/log/Syncdf/system 





output message: /var/log/Syncdf/stream 




output message: /var/log/Syncdf/messages 
output packet: /var/log/Syncdf/messages_packet 




output message: /var/log/Syncdf/messages 
output packet: /var/log/Syncdf/messages jacket 
output syslog: locaW 
} 
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4.6.9 Rules and alerts classes 
Rules and the alerts they generate can be categorized in classes to specify their severity. 
Alert classes must first be defined using the config classification command and each rule 
belonging in a particular category must contain the classtype filter (described later on). 
The format of the config classification command is: 
config classification: name, description, priority; 
where name is the name of the class, description is a short description of the class and 
priority is the priority of the class. 
4.6.10 Filters 
Here is a list of supported filter keywords: msg, flags, seq, ack, window, itype, icode, 
icmpid, icmpseq, id, tos, sameip, ip_proto, ipopts, ttl,fragbits, content, uricontent, 
nocase, dsize, offset, depth, rpc,floodp,floodb, classtype, sid, rev and reference. Each of 
them is describe in the next section. 
A colon, its arguments and a semi-colon must follow every filter that takes one or more 
arguments. 
4.6.10.1 msg filter 
The msg filter specifies the message corresponding to a rule: it is this message that will 
appear in logs when a rule triggers an alert. This filter must be followed by a quote-
surrounded message and its format is: 
msg: "message"; 
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where message is the message to be used. As an example: 
warning udp $external any -> $web_server 514 (msg: "Remote syslog datagram"; ) 
An UDP datagram that triggers this rule would create a log message similar to this: 
08-07-18 12:01:55 | Remote syslog datagram (UDP 20/8/120 4.3.3.4:1050 -> 4.2.1.3:514) 
[19] 
4.6.10.2 flags filter 
The flags filter checks TCP flags of TCP segments using an operator and a flags mask. 
This filter's format is 
flags: <operator> flaglist; 
where operator is an optional operator described next and flaglist is a list of the 
following flags: 
F FIN flag 
S SYN flag 
R RST flag 
P PSH flag 
A ACK flag 
U URG flag 
1 Reserved flag bit #1 
2 Reserved flag bit #2 
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0 No flags 
By default, flags are checked for exact match. This behavior can, however, be modified 
using one of the following operators: 
+ Other flags than the ones specified may be set 
* At least one flag in the ones specified must be set 
! No flags specified must be set 
As an example, 
warning tcp $external any -> $web_server 80 (msg: "Connection attempt to web 
server "; flags: S;) 
warning tcp $external any -> Stelnet server 23 (msg: "URG data to telnet server"; 
flags: + U;) 
warning tcp $external any -> Sinternal any (msg: "Reserved TCP flags set"; flags: *12; 
) 
The first rule looks for packets with only the SYN flag while the second rule searches 
packets with the URG flag set (any other flags may be set). Finally, the last rule checks 
for packet which have at least the 1 or 2 flag set. 
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4.6.10.3 seq filter 
The seq filter checks TCP segments for a specific sequence number. The seq filter's 
format is: 
seq: number; 
where number is a sequence number between 0 and 2A32-1. As an example, 
warning tcp $external any -> $internal any (msg: 'TCP segment with sequence number 
1234567"; seq: 1234567;) 
This rule looks for any TCP segment with an sequence number of 1234567. 
4.6.10.4 ack filter 
The ack filter checks TCP segments for a specific acknowledgement number. This 
filter's format is: 
ack: number; 
where number is an acknowledgement number between 0 and 2A32-1. As an example, 
warning tcp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "TCP segment with acknowledgement 
number 7654321"; ack: 7654321; ) 
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This rule looks for any TCP segment with an acknowledgement number of 7654321. 
4.6.10.5 window filter 
The window filter checks TCP segments for a specific window size. The format of this 
filter is: 
window: size; 
where size is a window size between 0 and 65535. As an example, 
warning tcp Sexternal any -> $internal any (msg: "TCP segment with window size of 
666"; window: 666;) 
This rule looks for any TCP segment with a window size of 666. 
4.6.10.6 itype filter 
The itype filter checks ICMP datagrams for a specific ICMP type. The format of the 
itype filter is: 
itype: type; 
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where type is an ICMP type between 0 and 255. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "ICMP destination unreachable"; 
itype: 3;) 
This rule looks for any ICMP datagram with a type of 3. 
4.6.10.6.1 icode filter 
The icode filter checks ICMP datagrams for a specific ICMP code. The format of the 
icode filter is: 
icode: coder, 
where code is an ICMP code between 0 and 255. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any ( msg: "ICMP echo request"; icode: 0; itype: 
8;) 
This rule looks for any ICMP datagram with a type of 8 and a code of 0. 
4.6.10.7 icmpjd filter 
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The icmpid filter checks ICMP echo datagrams (ICMP type of 8 or 0 and ICMP code of 
0) for a specific identification number. The format of this filter is: 
icmpid: id; 
where id is an identification number between 0 and 65535. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "ICMP datagram with ID of 666"; 
icmpid: 666;) 
This rule looks for any ICMP echo datagram with an identification number of 666. 
4.6.10.8 icmp_seq filter 
The icmpseq filter checks ICMP echo datagrams (ICMP type of 8 or 0 and ICMP code 
of 0) for a specific sequence value. The format of the icmpseq filter is: 
icmpseq: seq; 
where seq is a sequence number between 0 and 65535. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any ( msg: "ICMP datagram with sequence of 
65535"; icmpseq: 65535;) 
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This rule looks for any ICMP echo datagram with a sequence number of 65535. 
4.6.10.9 id filter 
The id filter checks IP datagrams for a specific identification number. This filter's format 
is: 
id: number; 
where number is an identification number between 0 and 65535. As an example, 
warning tcp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "TCP segment with IP ID of 0"; id: 0; ) 
This rule looks for TCP segments with an IP identification number of 0. 
4.6.10.10 ipjproto filter 
The ip_proto filter checks IP datagrams for a specific protocol number. The format of 
this filter is: 
ip_proto: protocol; 
where protocol is a protocol number between 0 and 255. As an example, 
warning ip $external any -> $internal any (msg: "IP protocol 129"; ip_proto: 129;) 
This rule looks for IP datagrams with an IP protocol number of 129. 





4.6.10.11 ipopts filter 
The ipopts filter checks IP datagrams for a specific IP option. This filter's format is: 
ipopts: option; 
where option must be one of the following: 
rr Record route 
eol End of list 
nop No operation 
ts Timestamp 
sec IP sec 
lsrr Loose source routing 
ssrr Strict source routing 
satid Stream identifier 
As an example, 
warning ip $external any -> $intemal any (msg: "IP datagram with record route option"; 
ipopts: rr;) 
This rule looks for IP datagrams with the "record route" IP option. 
4.6.10.12 «/filter 
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The til filter evaluates IP datagrams' time-to-live value with a specified operator and 
value. The format of this filter is: 
ttl: <operator> value; 
where operator is an optional argument which may be < or > (it is = by default) and 
value is the TTL value to compare against. As an example, 
warning ip $external any -> $internal any (msg: "IP datagram with very low TTL"; ttl: < 
3;) 
This rule looks for IP datagrams with a TTL smaller than 3. 
4.6.10.13 fragbits filter 
The fragbits filter checks fragmentation flags of IP datagrams using an operator and a 
flags mask. The format of the fragbits filter is: 
fragbits: <operator> flag list; 
where operator is an optional operator described next and flag list is a list of the 
following flags: 
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M More fragments 
D Don't fragment 
R Reserved flag 
By default, flags are checked for exact match. This behaviour can, however, be modified 
using one of the following operators: 
+ Other flags than the ones specified may be set 
* At least one flag in the ones specified must be set 
! No flags specified must be set 
As an example, 
warning ip any any -> any any ( msg: "Reserved bit set in IP datagram"; fragbits: R; ) 
This rule looks for any IP datagram with the reserved bit set. 
4.6.10.14 dsize filter 
The dsize filter checks packets' payload length using an operator and a size. The format 
of this filter is: 
dsize: <operator> size', 
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where operator is an optional argument which may be < or > (it is = by default) and 
sizee is the payload size to compare against. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "ICMP datagram with payload > 
1000 bytes"; dsize: > 1000; ) 
This rule looks for ICMP datagrams with a payload of more than 1000 bytes. 
4.6.10.15 content filter 
The content filter searches packets' payload for a particular string. The format of the 
content filter is: 
content: "string"; 
where string is the string to search. The following quote " character, the pipe | character 
and the semicolon ; character must be escaped. Binary data or escaped characters must 
be enclosed in pipe | characters and their value specified in hexadecimal. As an example, 
warning tcp $external any -> Sinternal 80 (msg: "x86 nops sent to web server"; 
content: " \90909090\";) 
warning tcp Sexternal any -> $internal 80 (msg: "finger.cgi script access "; content: 
"finger.cgi";) 
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The first rule checks the payload of TCP segments for the 4 consecutive bytes 90h 90h 
90h 90h while the second searches for the string finger.cgi. 
4.6.10.16 uricontent filter 
The uricontent filter is identical to the content filter, except that only URI portion of a 
request in a payload is searched. Please refer to the content filter for format. 
4.6.10.17 nocase filter 
The nocase filter affects the behavior of the last content or uricontent filter specified by 
making comparisons case insensitive. The format of this filter is: 
nocase; 
As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "The two strings matches"; content: 
"Some string"; content: "another string"; nocase; ) 
This rule searches ICMP datagrams for the string "Some string" in a case sensitive 
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fashion and then searches again for the string "another string" in a case insensitive 
fashion. 
4.6.10.18 offset filter 
The offset filter affects the behavior of the last content or uricontent filter specified by 
starting any string search at a particular offset into the payload. The format of this filter 
is: 
offset: value; 
where value is the offset minus 1 from which to start a string search. As an example, 
warning icmp $external any -> $internal any (msg: "Suspicious string found in ICMP 
datagram at byte 11 or later"; content: "Suspicious"; offset: 10;) 
This rule searches ICMP datagrams for the string "Suspicious" from the 11th (10+1) 
character of the payload until its end. 
4.6.10.19 depth filter 
The depth filter affects the behavior of the last content or uricontent filter specified by 
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stopping any string search after a particular number of characters inspected. The format 
of this filter is: 
depth: value; 
where value is the number of characters to be inspected. As an example, 
warning icmp Sexternal any -> $internal any (msg: "Suspicious string found in ICMP 
datagram"; content: "Suspicious"; offset: 10;) 
This rule searches ICMP datagrams for the string "Suspicious" from the 11th (10+1) 
character of the payload until its end. 
4.6.10.20 rpc filter 
The rpc filter checks UDP or TCP packets for RPC requests matching particular 
application, procedure and version. The format of the rpc filter is: 
rpc: application,procedure,version; 
where application is an application number, procedure is a procedure number or * to 
indicate any procedure and version is a version number or * to indicate any version. As 
an example, 
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warning udp any any -> $rpc_server 111 (msg: "RPC getport request"; rpc: 100000,*,*; 
) 
This rules cheks every UDP datagram going to a RPC server for getport requests. 
4.6.10.21 floodp filter 
The floodp filter checks for packet floods. It is a special type of filter: every time a rule 
in which it is present matches a packet, its count is increased by 1. If the count, during a 
10 second period, exceeds the limit specified by the argument to the floodp filter, the 
message contained in the msg filter of the rule is sent to the Syncd ruletype. Any 
ruletypes specified in the action field of the rule will not be executed except for drop 
actions. The format of this filter is: 
floodp: count; 
where count is the maximum packet number before an alert is triggered. It is 
recommended to define an empty ruletype to use fox floodp and floodb filters instead of 




none tcp any any -> $web_server 80 ( flags: S; floodp: 500; msg: "SYN flood to web 
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server";) 
This rule counts TCP segments with the SYN flag set going to the a web server. If more 
than 500 packets are counted during a 10 second period, a message is sent to the Syncd 
ruletype. A flood message might look like this: 
08-07-01 11:52:56 | SYN flood to web server (516 packets totaling 39876 bytes in 10 
seconds) 
This alert means that 516 packets matching the rule in question (TCP segments to a web 
server on port 80 and with the SYN flag set) were detected in a 10 second period. These 
516 packets made up 39876 bytes of traffic. 
It must be noted that floodp and floodb filters can be combined in a single rule. 
4.6.10.22 floodb filter 
The floodb filter checks for traffic floods. It is a special type of filter: every time a rule in 
which it is present matches a packet, its count is increased by the total size of the packet 
(including the link layer). If the count, during a 10 second period, exceeds the limit 
specified by the argument to the floodb filter, the message contained in the msg filter of 
the rule is sent to the Syncd ruletype. Any ruletypes specified in the action field of the 
rule will not be executed except for drop actions. The format of the floodb filter is: 
floodb: bytes; 
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where bytes is the maximum number of bytes before an alert is triggered. It is 
recommended to define an empty ruletype to use for floodp and floodb filters instead of 




none icmp any any -> any any ( floodb: 1000000; msg: "ICMP flood on network"; ) 
This rule matches every ICMP datagrams and calculates their total size. If more than 
1000000 bytes are counted during a 10 second period, a message is sent to the Syncd 
ruletype. A flood message might look like this: 
08-07-01 11:57:40 | ICMP flood on network (800 packets totaling 1009560 bytes in 10 
seconds) 
This alert means that 800 packets matching the rule in question (any ICMP datagram) 
were detected in a 10 second period. These 800 packets made up 10009560 bytes of 
traffic. 
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4.6.10.23 classtype filter 
The classtype filter specifies which class an alert belongs and allows classification of 
alerts in different severity categories. The format of the classtype filter is: 
classtype: name; 
where name is the name of the class an alert belongs to (these can be declared using the 
config classification command). As an example, 
warning ip any any -> any any ( msg: "Reserved bit set in IP datagram"; fragbits: R; 
classtype: unknown;) 
This rule classifies logged IP datagrams with the reserved bit set in the unknown 
category. 
4.6.10.24 sid filter 
The sid filter specifies a unique identification number to each rule. Its format is: 
sid: number; 
where number is the identification number of the rule. 
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4.6.10.25 rev filter 
The rev filter specifies a revision number for a particular rule. Its format is: 
rev: number; 
where number is the revision number of the rule. 
4.6.10.26 reference filter 
The reference filter allows references to be added to a rule. These references provide 
information about a particular rule and may be in any of the following known reference 
systems: bugtraq, arachnids, CVE, mcaffee or url (which specifies a URL to rule-related 
information). The format of this filter is: 
reference: system; 
where system is the reference system of the rule. 
4.7 Preprocessors 
Preprocessors perform special operations on application data which help the system 
recognize particular attacks. Each preprocessor has its particular purpose and may 
generate alerts to indicate suspicious activities. 
4.7.1 arp_validate preprocessor 
The arpvalidate preprocessor validate the source Ethernet address with the source IP 
address of an IP datagram to detect spoofing. It is used with the following syntax: 
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"preprocessor arp_validate: filename" where filename is the name of the preprocessor 
configuration file containing rules to be applied to IP datagrams. This file, which may 
content line-comments and use variables, has a special format which is: 
POLICY SOURCE IP from SOURCE ETHERNET 
POLICY \s allow: or deny: depending on whether or not you wish to allow traffic that 
matches the rule to be allowed or denied. 
SOURCEIP is one or a list of IP addresses to be used as source IP address for packets 
inspected. It is in the same format as SOURCEIP and DESTINATION IP used in the 
general rule format. 
SOURCE ETHERNET'is one or a list of Ethernet addresses to be used as source Ethernet 
address for packets inspected. It can be a single Ethernet address such as 
01:b4:05:ef:30:99 or a list of bracket-surrounded and comma-separated Ethernet 
addresses such as [12:23:34:45:56,aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ffj'. Furthermore, a negation operator 
can be added to match any other Ethernet address such as !05:06:07:08:09:0a. 
As an example, let's consider a detection system listening on a DMZ with a router 
(Ethernet address 01:01:01:02:02:02) connected to the Internet, another router (Ethernet 
address 04:04:04:03:03:03) connected to a protected network (IP addresses of 1.2.4.0/24). 
Furthermore, the servers on the DMZ are in the 1.2.5.0/24 network. To protect against 
spoofing, the preprocessor configuration file should be: 
# # # # # 
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# Sample arpvalidate preprocessor configuration file 
# Allow external traffic from the router connected to the Internet 
allow: 11.2.4.0/23 from 01:01:01:02:02:02 
# Allow internal traffic from the router connected to the protected network 
allow: 1.2.4.0/24 from 04:04:04:03:03:03 
# Allow DMZ server traffic from any other Ethernet address than those of the routers 
allow: 1.2.5.0/24 from ![01:01:01:02:02:02,04:04:04:03:03:03] 
# Deny everything else 
deny: any from any 
4.7.2 defrag preprocessor 
The defrag preprocessor reassembles fragmented IP datagrams into one IP datagram to 
help analyze its content. It is used with the following syntax: "preprocessor defrag: 
memcap: maxjnemory" where maxjnemory is the maximum amount of memory that 
may be allocated by the preprocessor. The "memcap: maxjnemory" argument is 
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optionnal and its default is 8000000 bytes. 
The defrag preprocessor logs its alerts to the defrag ruletype. It is recommended to use 
the arpvalidate preprocessor if the defrag preprocessor is used. 
4.7.3 stream preprocessor 
The stream preprocessor reassembles TCP application sent in different segments into one 
continuous buffer to help analyze its content. It is used with the following syntax: 
"preprocessor stream: memcap: maxjnemoty, timeout: timeout delay, flush: 
flushsize, port: portlist" where maxjnemory is the maximum amount of memory that 
may be allocated by the preprocessor, timeout delay is the time after which a TCP 
connection will be declared dead, flushsize is the maximum number of bytes of 
application data that is kept before a packet is reassembled (if a TCP segment contains 
more application data than flushsize, it might not go through the packet reassembly, so it 
will not be profiled) and its content flushed and portlist is a list of space-separated port 
numbers (or the keyword any) on which TCP connections will be monitored. The 
"memcap: maxjnemory" argument is optional and its default is 16000000 bytes. The 
"timeout: timeout delay" argument is optional and its default is 120 seconds. The 
"flush: flushsize" argument is optional and its default is 128 bytes. The "port: portlist" 
argument is optional and its default is no port (which means nothing will be done). 
To permit packets to be reassembled, another command must be used: "preprocessor 
stream_reassemble: source: srcjportlist, destination: dst_portlisf where srcjportlist 
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is the list of TCP source ports from which packets must be to be reassembled and 
dst_portlist is the list of TCP destination ports to which packets must be going to be 
reassembled (it must be noted that these two lists are applied in an "OR fashion", 
meaning that packets must only be in one of the two lists to be reassembled). The 
"source: src_portlist" and the "destination: dstjportlist" arguments are optionnal and 
their default is no port (which means nothing will be done). 
As an example, a system administrator wishing to reassemble TCP streams of clients 
connecting to port 21,23, 25, 80,110 and 111 and of server responses on ports 80 and 
443 would setup the preprocessor like this: 
preprocessor stream: port: 21 23 25 80 110 111 443 
preprocessor streamreassemble: source: 80 443 , destination: 21 23 25 110111 
The stream preprocessor logs its alerts to the stream ruletype. It is recommended to use 
the defrag preprocessor and the arpvalidate preprocessor if the stream preprocessor is 
used. 
4.8 Streams profiling 
Stream profiling is automatically enabled if the stream preprocessor is used. However, 
stream profiling is only performed on packets reassembled. Each type of profiling needs 
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a different kind of packets to be reassembled. Here is a list: 
HTTP and HTTPS profiling: TCP source ports 80 and 443 
SMTP profiling: TCP destination port 25 
telnet profiling: TCP destination port 23 
FTP profiling: TCP destination port 21 
4.8.1 httpdecode preprocessor 
The http_decode preprocessor translates escaped caracters in HTTP requests into their 
equivalent so they can be searched by content filters. It is used with the following 
syntax: "preprocessor http_decode: portlist" where portlist is a list of space-separated 
destination TCP ports. Any TCP application data going to these ports will be verified for 
escaped caracters. 
The httpdecode preprocessor logs its alerts to the http ruletype. It is recommended to 
use the stream preprocessor if the httpdecode preprocessor is used. 
4.8.2 telnet_decode preprocessor 
The telnetdecode preprocessor removes escape sequences from TCP application data 
going to ports 21 and 23 so it can be searched by content filters. It is used with the 
following syntax: "preprocessor teInet_decode". 
The telnetdecode does not generate alerts. It is recommended to use the stream 
preprocessor if the telnetdecode preprocessor is used. 
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4.8.3 rpc_decode preprocessor 
The rpcdecode preprocessor reassembles fragmented RPC traffic so it can be searched 
by content filters. It is used with the following syntax: "preprocessor rpc_decode: 
portlist" where portlist is a list of space-separated destination TCP ports. Any TCP 
application data going to these ports will be inspected. 
4.9 Log output 
4.9.1 Log entries 
Here is an example of text format log entry that would be sent to a message file, in a 
SNMPvl trap or to syslog: 
08-07-17 16:02:03 | SCAN Proxy attempt (TCP 20/28/0 1.2.3.4:1024 -> 5.6.7.8:1080 — 
-S-) [45] 
This means the alert occurred on July 17th 2008 at 16:02 and 3 seconds. The alert was a 
proxy scan attempt. The protocol used was TCP, the IP header length was 20, the TCP 
header length was 28 and there was 0 bytes of application data. The scan was from 
1.2.3.4 port 1024 to 5.6.7.8 port 1080. There was a TCP flag set, the SYN flag. The 
number in brackets at the end indicates that this packet was logged in a packet file with 
an identification number of 45. The packet can now be inspected using the ipacket tool 
(described later). 
4.9.2 Stream preprocessor alerts 
Here is a list of possible alerts generated by the stream preprocessor and their meaning. 
These types of unusual traffic patterns may lead to the discovery of covert channels. 
74 
SPl/possible-stealth-port-scan: A packet not belonging to any known TCP stream and 
that could be used in stealth scanning was detected. 
SP2/data-on-syn: A packet with the TCP SYN flag set contained application data. 
SP3/data-on-syn-ack: A packet with the TCP SYN and ACK flags set contained 
application data. 
SP5/data-on-rst: A packet with the TCP RST flag set contained application data. 
SP6/data-mismatch: Two packets contained overlapping data which did not match. This 
is frequently used in reassembly evasion attempt. 
SP7/same-seq-different-flags: Two packets having the same sequence numbers had 
flags which could not have been sent in the order which they were received. This can 
happen if an attacker sends a TCP packet with the TCP RST or the TCP FIN flag set and 
then continues sending data. 
SP9/data-past-termination: Application data was sent with a sequence number greated 
than a TCP FIN or a TCP RST. This can happen if an attacker sends a TCP packet with 
the TCP RST or the TCP FIN flag set and then continues sending data. 
SPlO/stream-alert: TCP packets reassembled after a stream has generated an alert are 
automatically logged for inspection. 
SPll/data-after-rst: TCP application data was sent by a host which previously sent an 
RST. 
SP13/data-past-fin: Application data was sent with a sequence number greated than a 
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TCP FIN. This can happen if an attacker sends a TCP packet with the TCP FIN flag set 
and then continues sending data. 
SP14/covert-channel-over-ftp: A TCP connection on port 21 contained data which did 
not look like regular FTP traffic. 
SP15/covert-channel-over-teInet: A TCP connection on port 23 contained data which 
did not look like regular TELNET traffic. 
SP16/covert-channel-over-http: A TCP connection on port 80 or 443 contained data 
which did not look like regular HTTP or HTTPS traffic. False alarms are most often the 
result of non RFC-compliant HTTP servers. When this happens, a very quick inspection 
of the application data of the packet logged will tell immediately if the data is correct or 
not. 
SP17/covert-channel-over-smtp: A TCP connection on port 25 contained data which 
did not look like regular SMTP traffic. 
4.9.3 IP defragmentation preprocessor alerts 
Here is a list of possible alerts generated by the IP defragmentation preprocessor and their 
meaning: 
DPl/overlapping-fragments: Two IP fragments contained data that overlapped. 
DP2/datagram-too-big: A set of IP fragments would create an IP datagram with a length 
superior to 65535 bytes if reassembled. 
4.9.4 ARP preprocessor alerts 
Here is a list of possible alerts generated by the ARP preprocessor and their meaning: 
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API/invalid-ARP-address: An IP datagram with an invalid ARP address was detected. 
This may indicate a misconflgured host or a spoofing attempt. 
4.9.5 Ipackettool 
Ipacket is a tool created to inspect packets that generated an alert and were logged in a 
packet file. The tool can be used to dump packet payload, complete packet or a specific 
packet ID in various formats, and display each byte of application data in any specified 
chronological order. 
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5 Chapter 5 
5.1 Performance evaluation 
In our approach, network traffic is tapped at the perimeter boundary, typically in line with 
the corporate firewall. The traffic can be recorded and processed at different levels of 
granularity, from complete packet-level traces to statistical figures. Compared to other 
approaches that use active capture [65], only passive capture is used, since it is best 
suitable for analysis of Internet backbone traffic properties. Our passive traffic capture 
method is software-based and we have modified the Solaris operating system and device 
in order to obtain copies of network packets. This approach is inexpensive and offers 
good adaptability; we recognize that its possibilities to measure traffic on high speed 
networks are limited to 10 Gbit/s line speeds [96]. A hardware-based method was 
examined, but determined to be rather costly and less versatile. 
Once network data is collected, it is processed online or in 'real time' and also stored 
offline for non time critical events and suspicious network data. This offers the possibility 
to correlate network traffic collected at different times and different locations. Our 
passive traffic capture operates on different protocol layers, the Internet Protocol (IP), 
located on the network layer and transport layer protocols, especially TCP and UDP, and 
application layer protocols are our main focus. Data gathered on different protocol layers 
can present different levels of granularity. 
Our approach provides packet-level traces that include all information of each packet 
observed on a specific host or link. 
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Certain challenges that we faced in our approach is scalability. We realized that our 
packet capture and analysis was strictly limited by hardware performance, storage and 
processing capabilities, but we have taken steps to mitigate this problem. First, average 
backbone link throughput are far from line speed, and secondly, we are filtering only 
packets with specific properties. Another problem, and as shown in [98], is that routing 
symmetry on highly aggregated links is rare, which means that bi-directional flow data 
can no longer be assumed. We have yet to address this problem. 
Our test setup consists of a sever running Solaris 10 with 8 core 1.2 GHz UltraSPARC Tl 
processors, 32 GB of memory, and gigabit Ethernet interfaces. The server is connected 
inline using a network tap with the corporate network security perimeter and follows the 
guidelines set by John [99] for passive internet traffic measurements. It is non-intrusive 
and can run continuously and provide results at any time scale. With this setup, we were 
able to scale to 3 Gbit/s without starting to drop packets and lessen our detection rate. 
This is the threshold we are considering the approximate maximum practical analysis rate 
for this hardware and this configuration and rulesets. 
6 Conclusions and Future work 
With increased measures being implemented to counter the more obvious security issues 
- such as the free transfer of USB sticks in- and out of an organization, the use of covert 
channels is certain to rise. In addition to this threat, it is important to realize that covert 
channels could also lead to direct circumvention of network security policies causing a 
potentially dangerous security incident. 
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This work presents a flexible and passive approach of profiling a multitude of covert 
TCP/IP channels. Specifically, the approach maintains client-server transparency 
because it passively captures link layer frames, thus not interfering with network 
throughput. The flexibility stems from the ability to be granular and use regular 
expression for many fields in the network flows. The approach consists of using covert 
channel detection schemes combined with anomalous network activity detection. We 
believe that this hybrid approach complements itself well and can be a basis for adding 
new and refined techniques in both the covert channel research area and the anomalous 
network activity area. Future work could include evaluating and integrating new HTTP 
preprocessors that use compression techniques [79] or the SPID algorithm [78] to detect 
covert HTTP more precisely and efficiently. New filters could be implemented that 
capture recent unusual network traffic patterns or detection evasion techniques. 
We believe this approach will appeal to companies who are sensitive to these types of 
security incidents and are looking for a cost effective way to mitigate the risk of covert 
channels. Presently, large scale implementations of SIEM'S (security information and 
event management) are used to correlate many sources of logs in an attempt to discover 
these types of covert channels. 
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